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PROPERTY—FORECLOSURE; IS IT BY ENTRY OR FOR EASE OF ENTRY? 
ISSUES OF FAIRNESS REGARDING THE MASSACHUSETTS FORECLOSURE 
BY ENTRY PROVISION 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine Mary, a thirty-six year-old widowed mother with five 
small children, working three jobs to provide for her family.  The young 
mother is a homeowner and in a debtor/creditor relationship with a 
lending bank.  Mary does not make much income, but from what she 
does make, most goes toward paying the mortgage on her home, 
maintaining the house, and providing food and clothing for her children.  
She is as hard working as they come and does nothing without putting 
her children’s best interests first. 
As the end of the year approaches, the cold weather really begins to 
set in, and Mary worries about how she will afford the high cost of 
heating her home in order to keep her children warm.  At the same time, 
she dreads the thought that the holidays are around the corner and knows 
how heartbroken her children will be when they do not get all of the 
expensive toys they so desperately asked for.  What is just about the last 
thing on her mind?  Her mortgage. 
However, Mary is a responsible homeowner and makes her last 
monthly payment on the mortgage for the year.  Although she 
remembered to make the mortgage payment, the renewal notice for her 
homeowners insurance got lost in the mail, and Mary never renewed the 
policy.  Insuring the building on the mortgaged property happens to be 
one of the conditions of the mortgage agreement between Mary and the 
lending institution.  Consequently, she has unknowingly defaulted on a 
condition of her mortgage.  As the home is located in Massachusetts, the 
lending institution decides that because it has been running into 
problems foreclosing by power of sale,1 it will foreclose by open and 
peaceable entry and continued possession.2  The lender has one of its 
associates gather two witnesses and make an entry upon the property.  
The entry happens to occur at 10:00 P.M., well after Mary has gone to 
 
1. The term of art “foreclosure by power of sale” will be discussed in greater detail later 
in the Note.  See discussion infra Part I.B.3. 
2. “Foreclosure by open and peaceable entry and continued possession” will be 
discussed in further detail later in the Note.  See discussion infra Part I.B.2. 
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sleep.  The three enter upon the mortgaged land in the dark of night, 
wearing their entirely black suits.  A certificate of entry is produced, 
which the witnesses sign.  Following the entry, the certificate is recorded 
at the local registry of deeds.  All of this happens without any process 
actually informing Mary of these events. 
Consequently, three years later, Mary receives a letter in the mail 
informing her that a foreclosure by entry was initiated on her property, 
and the three-year redemption period in which she had the opportunity to 
redeem the property has ended.  The letter further advises Mary that an 
action for eviction will commence, and once the eviction is completed, 
she will have thirty days to vacate the previously mortgaged land.  This 
does not seem to be a just administration of the law, nor does it appear to 
promote fairness to a mortgaging homeowner.  However, this is exactly 
what could happen under Massachusetts law.3  Given the recent 
foreclosure crisis, which affected mortgaging homeowners across the 
United States, this provision seems to be unnecessarily burdensome on 
homeowners.4 
The Massachusetts foreclosure by entry statutory provision extends 
as far back as the eighteenth century, if not further.5  Foreclosure by 
entry was used frequently in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as 
the primary method of foreclosure.6  Since then, its prevalence has 
dwindled, and in recent years, this method has been used as a secondary 
method of foreclosure.7  The provision seemingly had more significance 
in the past when it was used in order to foreclose on mortgaged 
properties that were abandoned or when the homeowner was absent for 
long periods of time.8  A thorough analysis proves that the foreclosure 
 
3. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, §§ 1-2 (2012). 
4. Subprime Mortgage Crisis, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, 1, 
http://www.stat.unc.edu/faculty/cji/fys/2012/Subprime%20mortgage%20crisis.pdf  (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2015). 
5. See Swift v. Mendell, 62 Mass. 357, 359 (1851) (holding that “the leading purpose of 
the open and peaceable entry, and the subsequent possession required by the statute of 
1785 . . . [was] to give ample and full notice to the mortgagor.”).  However, the foreclosure by 
entry statute has not been at issue recently given the minimal cases dealing with it in recent 
years.   
6. See generally 6 BAXTER DUNAWAY, THE LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE § 
69:16 (2013). 
7. “The vast majority of foreclosures in Massachusetts involve both the sale method and 
the entry method.”  Id. 
8. Most cases involving a dispute regarding a foreclosure by entry are from the 
nineteenth century.  See generally Ellis v. Drake, 90 Mass. 161 (1864); Lennon v. Porter, 71 
Mass. 318 (1855); Bennett v. Conant, 64 Mass. 163, 167 (1852); Fay v. Valentine, 22 Mass. 
418, 425 (1827); Skinner v. Brewer, 21 Mass. 468 (1827); Thayer v. Smith, 17 Mass. 429 
(1821). 
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by entry provision no longer holds the same worth in modern day 
society, aside from the fact that it provides mortgagees with an unfair 
advantage in the foreclosure process.9 
The foreclosure by entry provision allows a lender to enter upon the 
mortgaged premises in the presence of two witnesses who substantiate 
the entry without alerting the homeowner of the entry and impending 
foreclosure.10  After recording a certificate of entry in the local registry 
of deeds, a three-year redemption period begins to run, during which the 
mortgagor has the opportunity to redeem the property.11  Once the 
redemption period ends, the mortgagor’s rights cease to exist.12  This 
Note calls into question the effectiveness of this redemption period in 
allowing homeowners to exercise their right to redeem the premises 
when the homeowner is not aware of the ongoing foreclosure. 
Furthermore, this Note argues that this method of foreclosure places 
an undue burden on mortgagors faced with the process of foreclosure 
and is unsettling in regards to public policy.  The foreclosure by entry 
provision in Massachusetts lacks clarity and direction in its 
requirements, and the relevant case law does nothing to refine the 
standards.13  This Note presents the concern that the foreclosure by entry 
provision either needs to be revised legislatively or judicially and 
 
9. The prevalence of cases involving foreclosure by entry related disputes are 
significantly disproportionate from the nineteenth century to the twenty-first century, which 
evidences the movement from using foreclosure by entry as a primary method of foreclosure 
to using it as a secondary or back up method to foreclose by power of sale.  See generally 
cases cited supra note 8; HS Land Trust LLC v. Gonzalez, 2012 WL 5362885 (Mass. Land Ct. 
Oct. 30, 2012); Singh v. 207-211 Main St., LLC, 937 N.E.2d 977 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010); 
Pellegrini v. Silva, 876 N.E.2d 498 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007). 
10. “A mortgagee may, after breach of condition of a mortgage of land, recover 
possession of the land mortgaged by an open and peaceable entry thereon, if not opposed by 
the mortgagor or other person claiming it, or by action under this chapter . . . .”  MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 244, § 1 (2004). 
11. Id. 
12. “[A]nd possession so obtained, if continued peaceably for three years from the date 
of recording of the memorandum or certificate as provided in section two, shall forever 
foreclose the right of redemption.”  Id. 
13. See e.g., HS Land Trust LLC, 2012 WL 5362885 (stating that the mortgagee’s 
possession continues up until the mortgagor acts adverse to the mortgagee’s possession, but 
gives no example of what an adverse action might include); Cunningham v. Davis, 56 N.E. 2 
(Mass. 1900) (stating that in order to interrupt the possession of the mortgagee, the mortgagor 
must act adversely to such possession; however, there is no discussion of what would 
constitute an adverse act); Walker v. Thayer, 113 Mass. 36 (1873) (plaintiffs were found not 
to have entered with force and violence when they used a crow bar to remove the window 
fasteners, and defendant’s opposition to entry was found sufficient by throwing hot water at 
the plaintiffs and hitting one with a stick, but no clear answer was given as to what would 
constitute force and violence on the part of the mortgagee, or what would comprise an 
insufficient opposition to an entry on the part of the mortgagor). 
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additionally updated to include more modern standards.  If revision is 
not possible, the provision should be repealed in order to establish 
fairness to all parties involved in the foreclosure process. 
Section I of this Note explains what a foreclosure is, when it can be 
instituted, the effect it has on the mortgage, and outlines the various 
methods and types of foreclosure available.  Part I.A details the nature of 
a foreclosure by examining the mortgage process, discussing the theories 
behind mortgage, and explaining the equity of redemption.  Part I.B 
describes the various methods of foreclosure available and the 
requirements of each.  Part I.C discusses the foreclosure crisis that the 
United States experienced in 2007, the impact it had on homeowners, 
and its continued effect on mortgages to date. 
Section II of this Note argues that the Massachusetts “foreclosure 
by entry” statutory provision unfairly burdens homeowners who are 
subject to the foreclosure process.  Part II.A analyzes the process of a 
foreclosure by entry in Massachusetts to highlight the burdens imposed 
on the homeowner by the lack of a requirement of actual notice to the 
mortgagor.  Further, it compares the purported constructive notice 
requirement of a foreclosure by entry with the actual notice requirement 
of foreclosure by power of sale to highlight the inefficacy of the former.  
Part II.B discusses the removal of the thirty-day limit to record the 
certificate of entry at the registry of deeds from the date of the entry.  
Further, it proposes that there should be some sort of time limitation on 
the recording of the certificate so as not to give the mortgagee all of the 
control in the foreclosure process. 
Section III of this Note focuses on statutory concerns that are raised 
in examining the foreclosure by entry provision.  This section maintains 
that the longstanding case law on this topic is vastly outdated, and that 
due to inconsistencies and ambiguities, legislative and/or judicial 
clarification is necessary.  Part III.A discusses the statutory requirement 
that the mortgagee make an open and peaceable entry, and argues that 
there is no clear definition of such an entry.  Part III.B explores the 
requirement of an open and continued possession by the mortgagee, and 
specifically looks at what the courts mean by “actions taken by the 
mortgagor adverse to the mortgagee.”14  Part III.B further discusses the 
concerns raised by the lack of clarity in the statute and inconsistency in 
the case law, and proposes that legislative clarification is necessary. 
Section IV of this Note focuses on the issues of practicality that 
arise in the context of foreclosure by entry.  Part IV.A explores the 
 
14 See infra note 208. 
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common usage of foreclosure by entry, discusses the relationship 
between the foreclosure by entry and the foreclosure by sale statutes, and 
argues that it is used as a fall back measure that significantly advantages 
the mortgagee.  Part IV.B explores the mortgagor’s potential options for 
redeeming the property during the three-year period and argues that there 
is not much, if anything, the homeowner can do to defend against a 
foreclosure by entry, unlike a foreclosure by power of sale.  Part IV.C 
questions the relevance of the foreclosure by entry provision given the 
recent protections that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has 
implemented and legislation that has been passed to safeguard 
homeowners in light of the foreclosure crisis.  Part IV.C also discusses 
the possible arguments that lending institutions could raise in support of 
the validity of such foreclosures. 
I. FORECLOSURE IN MASSACHUSETTS 
A. What is Foreclosure? 
The right to foreclose is best described as the right to cut off 
completely a borrower’s or mortgagor’s right to redeem given by 
equity.15  After the foreclosure, by condition of the mortgage, the estate 
of the mortgagee or purchaser at a foreclosure sale becomes absolute at 
law.16  Although it is most commonly referred to as a foreclosure of a 
mortgage, what is actually foreclosed is the mortgagor’s right to redeem 
ownership of the land from the mortgagee.17  The mortgagee’s right to 
foreclose is fundamental in the nature of the mortgage process and 
accrues upon the breach of a condition, the performance of which the 
mortgage is intended to secure.18 
Basically, foreclosure is a process in which a lending institution 
attempts to recover the balance of a loan from the borrower’s security 
when the borrower has stopped making payments to the lender or 
defaulted on the loan in some other fashion.19  It is important to note that 
 
15. Shepard v. Richardson, 11 N.E. 738, 747 (Mass. 1887). 
16. Id.  “The debtor is the ‘mortgagor . . . the creditor is the ‘mortgagee,’” and “a 
‘mortgage’ is the document used to create the security interest in land.”  ROGER BERNHARDT 
& ANN M. BURKHART, REAL PROPERTY IN A NUTSHELL, 343 (5th ed. 2005).  In discussion 
regarding mortgages and foreclosure, the homeowner-borrower is termed the “mortgagor,” 
and the bank-lender is referred to as the “mortgagee.”  Edith Lank, Mortgagee VS. Mortgagor, 
REALTY TIMES REAL ESTATE NEWS AND ADVICE (Oct. 27, 2013, 4:48 PM), 
http://realtytimes.com/consumeradvice/mortgageadvice1/item/23342-19990114_mtgevsmtgor.   
17. 5 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, § 1512 (3d ed. 
1939).  See, e.g., Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d 884, 894 (Mass. 2011). 
18. TIFFANY, supra note 16, § 1512. 
19. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009) (defining foreclosure as 
BRITTANI MORGAN 7/13/15  7:05 PM 
96 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37: 91 
there are various approaches to execute a foreclosure, and the procedures 
used tend to vary depending on the geographic location.20  In 
Massachusetts, the most common types of foreclosures used by 
mortgagees are the foreclosure by power of sale and the foreclosure by 
entry.21 
1. Mortgage Basics 
When a person borrows money to purchase real estate, the borrower 
promises the lender that the money will be repaid.22  This assurance of 
repayment is memorialized in a promissory note, often simply referred to 
as the “note.”23  Concurrently, the borrower provides security for the 
promise to repay by means of a mortgage.24  In Massachusetts, a 
mortgage typically arises when the owner of real property owes a debt, 
commonly to a bank or financial institution, which lends the owner the 
funds necessary to acquire the real estate.25  Subsequently, the owner 
conveys the property to the lender subject to defeasance upon payment 
of the remaining debt.26  If and when the mortgagor pays the debt owed, 
the mortgagee’s interest in the real property ceases to exist, and the 
mortgage is satisfied.27  In Massachusetts, it has been long established 
that a mortgage is a conveyance giving a mortgagee title to the land, 
which is subject to defeasance upon performance of the condition.28 
 
“[a] legal proceeding to terminate a mortgagor’s interest in property, instituted by the lender 
(the mortgagee) either to gain title or to force a sale in order to satisfy the unpaid debt secured 
by the property.”). 
20. “Foreclosure processes are different in every state.” Secretary Shaun Donovan, 
Foreclosure Process, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. (March 17, 2014, 2:34 PM), 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/topics/avoiding_foreclosure/ foreclosureprocess.  
21. “The vast majority of foreclosures in Massachusetts involve both the sale method 
and the entry method.”  6 BAXTER DUNAWAY, supra note 6, § 69:16. 
22. Claire Alexis Ward, Throw the Book at Them: Testing Mortgagor Remedies in 
Foreclosure Proceedings after U.S. Bank v. Ibanez, 66 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 269 
(2012); see U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 2011). 
23. Ward, supra note 21; see generally U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 941 N.E.2d 40.  
24. Ward, supra note 21; see Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40; see, e.g., BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1101 (9th ed. 2009) (defining mortgage as “[a] conveyance of title to property 
that is given as security for the payment of a debt or the performance of a duty and that will 
become void upon payment or performance according to the stipulated terms.”).  See 
generally Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40. 
25. 14C MASS. PRAC., Mortgages § 15.105 (4th ed. 2009); see GRANT S. NELSON & 
DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW, § 1.1, 1 (5th ed. 2007). 
26. 14C MASS. PRAC., supra note 24, § 15.105.; see NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 
24, § 1.1, at 1.   
27. 14C MASS. PRAC., supra note 24, § 15.105.; see Pineo v. White, 70 N.E.2d 294, 
296 (Mass. 1946). 
28. 28 MASS. PRAC., Real Estate Law § 9.2 (4th ed. 2004); see generally Pineo, 70 
BRITTANI MORGAN 7/13/15  7:05 PM 
2015] FORECLOSURE; IS IT BY ENTRY OR FOR EASE OF ENTRY? 97 
2. Theories of Mortgage 
There are three different theories regarding the general nature of a 
mortgagee’s interest in the land in the United States.29  The recognized 
theories are the title theory, the lien theory, and the intermediate theory, 
which is a combination of both the title and lien theories.30 
Massachusetts is among the minority of states that follow the “title-
theory” of mortgages31 in which the mortgage gives the mortgagee legal 
title to the real estate.32  Under the title theory the homeowner-mortgagor 
maintains merely equitable title to the property.33  When the mortgage is 
held separately from the note, the mortgagee holds title in trust for the 
note holder, who has the equitable right to seek assignment of the 
mortgage to itself.34  A mortgage therefore splits the title in two parts, 
the legal title retained by a mortgagee, and the equitable title held by the 
mortgagor.35  The rationale behind this theory is that up until default and 
subsequent foreclosure, the mortgagor maintains full control and 
possession of the property.36  The practical application is that a 
mortgagor can otherwise deal with the property as his own estate, 
conditioned on the mortgage.37  The main aspect of the transfer of title to 
the mortgagee is to allow the mortgaged property to be available as 
 
N.E.2d 294. 
29. 33 BALDWIN’S OH. PRAC. REAL EST. LAW, Mortgages—Lien, Title, and 
Intermediate Theories § 33:2 (2003). 
30. Id. 
31. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 476 (9th ed. 2009) (defining deed of trust as 
“[a] deed conveying title to real property to a trustee as security until the grantor repays a loan.  
This type of deed resembles a mortgage.”). 
32. “Massachusetts is among the minority of about ten states, including five of the New 
England states, which follow the ‘title’ theory of mortgages.”  14C MASS. PRAC., supra note 
24, § 15.105.  See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 24, § 4.1, at 193, n.11; Ward, supra note 
21; “Massachusetts follows the title theory of mortgages.  Thus, a mortgage takes the form of 
a deed of conveyance of real property, transferring a fee interest to the mortgagee, defeasible 
upon the performance of the conditions stated therein.”  14C MASS. PRAC., supra note 24, § 
15.116.   
33. Ward, supra note 21; see U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 
2011).  See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1622 (9th ed. 2009) (defining equitable title as 
“[a] title that indicates a beneficial interest in property and that gives the holder the right to 
acquire formal legal title.  Before the Statute of Uses (1536), an equitable title was enforceable 
only in a court of chancery, not of law.”). 
34. Ward, supra note 21; see Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 53. 
35. “This means that when a mortgage is executed, a fee interest is conveyed to the 
mortgagee subject to defeasance upon performance of the conditions stated in the mortgage, 
the mortgagor retaining an ‘equity of redemption’ and the right to possession.”  14C MASS. 
PRAC., supra note 24, § 15.105.  See Pineo v. White, 70 N.E.2d 294, 296 (Mass. 1946). 
36. 14C MASS. PRAC., supra note 24, § 15.105; see Ewer v. Hobbs, 46 Mass. 1, 3 
(1842). 
37. 14C MASS. PRAC., supra note 24, § 15.105; see Ewer, 46 Mass. at 3. 
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security.38  From a societal standpoint, the mortgagor is viewed as the 
practical owner of the real property that is mortgaged.39  Thus, 
fulfillment of all the conditions of the mortgage allow for the mortgagor 
to be discharged of the mortgage obligations so as to eliminate a cloud 
upon the record title to the property.40 
There is one significant differentiating factor between the title 
theory and the lien theory in regards to the nature of a mortgage.41  The 
title theory allows for a mortgagee to enter into possession of the 
mortgaged premises upon default and prior to instituting foreclosure 
proceedings, whereas under the lien theory, the mortgagee has no 
inherent right of possession until a foreclosure is instituted.42  The lien 
theory requires the mortgagee to wait for the foreclosure of the 
mortgaged property and allows the mortgagee to obtain satisfaction for 
the mortgagor’s debt from the proceeds of the foreclosure sale.43  This 
nuance is why foreclosure by entry is not available in lien theory states, 
and thus does not raise any issue.44 
3. Redemption Periods 
When the right of redemption came to be recognized, it also became 
necessary for there to be a limited time within which this right to redeem 
could be exercised.45  The rationale behind such an approach was to 
provide justice to the mortgagee.46  When the mortgagor’s right of 
redemption is foreclosed, the real estate is no longer mortgaged land.47  
 
38. 14C MASS. PRAC., supra note 24, § 15.105; see Krikorian v. Grafton Co-op. Bank, 
44 N.E.2d 665, 666 (Mass. 1942). 
39. 14C MASS. PRAC., supra note 24, § 15.105; see City of Boston v. Quincy Mkt. Cold 
Storage & Warehouse Co., 45 N.E.2d 959, 966 (Mass. 1942). 
40. 14C MASS. PRAC., supra note 24, § 15.105; see Pineo, 70 N.E.2d at 296. 
41. 55 AM. JUR. 2d Mortgages § 470 (2007); see generally Maglione v. BancBoston 
Mortg. Corp., 557 N.E.2d 756 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990). 
42. 55 AM. JUR. 2d Mortgages § 470 (2007); see generally Maglione, 557 N.E.2d 756. 
43. 55 AM. JUR. 2d Mortgages § 470 (2007); see generally Maglione, 557 N.E.2d 756. 
44. “Strict foreclosure by entry and possession is a concomitant of the title theory of 
mortgages, and makes absolute the title which the mortgagee already has by destroying the 
mortgagor’s equity of redemption; it does not work under the lien theory of mortgages.”  55 
AM. JUR. 2d Mortgages § 470 (2007).  See Adair v. Kona Corp., 452 P.2d 449, 453 (Haw. 
1969). 
45. TIFFANY, supra note 16, § 1518.  See 4 JAMES KENT, KENT’S COMMENTARIES 181 
(14th ed. 1896); RICHARD HOLMES COOTE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES 990 
(2nd ed. 1850). 
46. TIFFANY, supra note 16, § 1518.  See 4 KENT, supra note 44, at ,181; COOTE, supra 
note 44, at 990. 
47. Santiago ex rel. Santiago v. Alba Mgmt., Inc., 928 N.E.2d 359, 363 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2010). 
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Rather, the former mortgagee then becomes the owner of both the legal 
and equitable interests in the property and the mortgage no longer 
exists.48  There are two variations of the mortgagor’s right to redeem, 
which include the equity of redemption and the statutory right of 
redemption.49  In differentiating between the two variants, it is helpful to 
think that equity of redemption is the period prior to the foreclosure, and 
statutory redemption is the period subsequent to the foreclosure.50 
a. Equity of Redemption 
The equity of redemption is a concept that gives a mortgagor in 
default the right to recover property prior to a foreclosure sale by paying 
not only the remaining principal, but also the accrued interest and all 
other costs that are due.51  Such is the case for a foreclosure by entry, 
where an equitable right of redemption continues for a period of three-
years after the initial entry is made, and the foreclosure is not complete 
until that right of redemption ends.52 
b. Statutory Redemption Period 
In many states there is a right, prescribed by statute, to endure for a 
specified period to redeem the property after foreclosure.53  The statutes 
expressly provide that a right of redemption shall continue for a certain 
 
48. Id.  “The mortgagor’s equitable title and right to redeem the mortgage are 
extinguished by the foreclosure deed, and the mortgage is discharged at that time.”  Ward, 
supra note 21. 
49. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (9th ed. 2009) (discussing the equity of 
redemption, stating that “[a] defaulting mortgagor with an equity of redemption has the right, 
until the foreclosure sale, to reimburse the mortgagee and cure the default” and further stating 
that “[i]n many jurisdictions, the mortgagor also has a statutory right to redeem within six 
months after the foreclosure sale.”). 
50. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1548 (9th ed. 2009) (defining statutory right 
of redemption); see, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (9th ed. 2009) (defining equity of 
redemption). 
51. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (9th ed. 2009) (defining equity of 
redemption as “[t]he right of a mortgagor in default to recover property before a foreclosure 
sale by paying the principal, interest, and other costs that are due”).  TIFFANY, supra note 16, 
§ 1500.  Essentially the equity of redemption ends with the foreclosure, whether it is the 
foreclosure sale or the ending of the three-year period of possession in the case of foreclosure 
by entry. 
52. TIFFANY, supra note 16, § 1500.  See Clark v. Crosby, 101 Mass. 184 (1869). 
53. TIFFANY, supra note 16, § 1500.  See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 
2009) (defining statutory right of redemption as “[t]he right of a mortgagor in default to 
recover property after a foreclosure sale by paying the principal, interest, and other costs that 
are owed, together with any other measure required to cure the default.  This statutory right 
exists in many states but is not uniform.”).  Essentially the statutory redemption period begins 
to run when the foreclosure takes place, so it would begin when the foreclosure sale is 
effectuated or after the three-year period of possession in a foreclosure by entry. 
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period of time after default by the mortgagor.54  Hence, this type of 
redemption is best thought of as an added period that some legislatures 
have created to allow the mortgagor more time after the foreclosure sale 
is executed or the three-year period of possession expires to redeem the 
land.55  However, there is no such statutory redemption period in 
Massachusetts.56  Therefore, once a foreclosure sale is executed and/or 
the three-year period of possession in a foreclosure by entry ends, the 
mortgage is forever foreclosed.57  
4. When Foreclosure Can Be Instituted 
 Generally, the mortgagee can initiate a foreclosure at a time 
specified within the mortgage documents.58  Typically, the process of 
foreclosure is started by some specified period of time after a 
mortgagor’s default of a condition in the mortgage.59  Under statutes 
allowing foreclosure by entry and possession, the right to initiate 
foreclosure proceedings does not begin to accrue until there has been a 
“distinct breach of the condition of the mortgage or failure of 
performance.”60  A foreclosure by power of sale may only be 
implemented if there is a default of the type stipulated in the mortgage 
document as authorizing the exercise of the power of sale.61  Breaching a 
mortgage by defaulting on a condition specified within the mortgage 
could include: the mortgagor’s stopping payment on the debt owed to the 
mortgagee; not paying the amount owed in a timely fashion; not paying 
the taxes due on the property; or even not securing insurance on the 
mortgaged property, as in the hypothetical example given above.62 
 
54. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009) (defining statutory right of 
redemption). 
55. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009). 
56. 2 BAXTER DUNAWAY, supra note 6, at app. 20A. 
57. Id.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 18 (2012) (stating “[t]he mortgagor . . . may, 
after breach of condition, redeem the land mortgaged, unless the mortgagee . . . has obtained 
possession of the land . . . and has continued that possession for three years, or . . . the land has 
been sold pursuant to a power of sale contained in the mortgage deed.”). 
58. See, e.g., Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Security Instrument Form 3022 for a 
Massachusetts Mortgage, available at http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/ unifsecurity.html 
(permitting the commencement of foreclosure proceedings following a thirty-day notice 
period to the borrower).   
59. Id. 
60. 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 723 (2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 1 (2012). 
61. 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 656 (2009). 
62. 28 MASS. PRAC., supra note 27 § 9.6. 
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5. Judicial Versus Non-Judicial Foreclosure 
There are two distinct processes of foreclosure that are followed in 
this country.63  One is a judicial or court-supervised foreclosure, and the 
other is a non-judicial foreclosure where there is no court involvement.64  
Judicial foreclosure, available in every state and required by many, 
involves a sale of the mortgaged property under the supervision of a 
court.65  The lender initiates the foreclosure by filing a lawsuit against 
the mortgagor in which all the parties involved must be notified of the 
impending foreclosure, and a judicial decision is subsequently 
announced after exchanged pleadings.66  In a judicial foreclosure, 
proceeds from the sale of the property first go toward paying the costs of 
administering the foreclosure, then satisfying the mortgage, then to any 
other potential lien holders, and finally to the mortgagor if there are any 
proceeds remaining.67 
By contrast, in a non-judicial foreclosure, the lender forecloses by 
exercising the power of sale in the mortgage or by entry and possession 
with little or no judicial oversight.68  Thus the non-judicial foreclosure 
process is, from the mortgagee’s perspective, generally much less time-
consuming, easier, and less expensive than a judicial foreclosure while 
accomplishing the same result.69  Due to the fact that Massachusetts is a 
non-judicial foreclosure state, unless the mortgagor brings an action to 
discontinue the foreclosure, the foreclosure proceeds without any type of 
judicial intervention.70 
B. Methods of Foreclosure 
The various types of foreclosure that exist today all stem from the 
original method of strict foreclosure, which simply vested title in the 
mortgagee after the redemption period expired.71  The different methods 
 
63. Other than strict foreclosure.  6 BAXTER DUNAWAY, supra note 6, § 64:4; see 
discussion infra Parts I.B.2-3.   
64. 6 BAXTER DUNAWAY, supra note 6, § 64:4.   
65. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009). 
66. See BAXTER DUNAWAY, supra note 6, §§ 16:1-16:45. 
67. Id. 
68. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009) (defining non-judicial 
foreclosure as “[a] foreclosure method that does not require court involvement.”); Elizabeth 
Renuart, Property Title Trouble in Non-Judicial Foreclosure States: The Ibanez Time Bomb?, 
4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 111, 146 (2013). 
69. Renuart, supra note 67, at 171; 2 BAXTER DUNAWAY, supra note 6, § 17:1. 
70. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 14 (2012); Ward, supra note 21. 
71. TIFFANY, supra note 16, § 1518; see 4 KENT, supra note 44, at 181; COOTE, supra 
note 44, at 990. 
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that eventually developed allow a foreclosure to be effectuated by 
judicial action,72 by bill in equity,73 by entry and continuation of 
possession for three years,74 and by auction sale executed under the 
statutory power of sale within a mortgage.75  Massachusetts is a non-
judicial foreclosure state; thus, the most prevalent methods of 
foreclosure are foreclosure by power of sale included in the mortgage 
and foreclosure by entry and possession.76  It is commonplace to 
foreclose a mortgage by exercise of a power of sale and, as a backup, by 
open and peaceable entry upon the premises to ensure the validity of the 
foreclosure.77 
1. Strict Foreclosure 
Before the courts of equity recognized the equity of redemption, 
there was no need for foreclosure since the mere breach of a condition 
vested an absolute estate in the mortgagee.78  Upon the development of 
the equity of redemption, strict foreclosure—at one time the only method 
of foreclosure—vested the title to the land in the mortgagee.79  However, 
since the introduction of a foreclosure by sale of the land, this method of 
foreclosure has acquired the distinctive name of “strict foreclosure.”80  
Strict foreclosure does not involve any type of sale.81  In a typical strict 
 
72. See discussion supra Part I.A.5; discussion infra Part I.B.4. 
73. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 185, § 1 (2012). 
74. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 1 (2012). 
75. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 11 (2012); 6 BAXTER DUNAWAY, supra note 6, § 
69:16.  
76. In re Loucheschi LLC, 496 B.R. 41, 46 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2013) (“There are four 
ways to foreclose a mortgage under Massachusetts law: (1) by peaceable entry . . . (2) by sale 
under a statutory power of sale . . . (3) by action, and (4) by a bill in equity . . . .  The third 
method is seldom used and the fourth is available only in extraordinary circumstances.”); see 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, §§ 1, 3-10, 11-15, 17 (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 185, § 1(k) 
(2012).   
77. 6 BAXTER DUNAWAY, supra note 6, § 69:16 (“It is the usual practice to foreclose 
mortgages by both open and peaceable entry and exercise of power of sale.  The reasoning 
being that if there should happen to be a defect in the exercise of the power of sale the 
foreclosure by entry would ripen into a completely valid foreclosure with the expiration of 
three years from the entry.”). 
78. TIFFANY, supra note 16, § 1518; see 4 KENT, supra note 44, at 181; COOTE, supra 
note 44, at 990. 
79. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009) (defining strict foreclosure 
as “[a] rare procedure that gives the mortgagee title to the mortgaged property — without first 
conducting a sale — after a defaulting mortgagor fails to pay the mortgage debt within a 
court-specified period.”).  TIFFANY, supra note 16, § 1518. 
80. TIFFANY, supra note 16, § 1518.  See generally 4 KENT, supra note 44, at 181; 3 
LEONARD A. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES OF REAL PROPERTY, ch. 34, 
§§ 1960–1962 (8th ed. 1928). 
81. 2 BAXTER DUNAWAY, supra note 6, at app. 20A.   
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foreclosure transaction, the mortgagor is assigned a “law day” before 
which he or she must redeem the property or be forever foreclosed of 
any equity in such property.82  Should no one redeem the property, the 
title becomes absolute in the foreclosing mortgagee on the day after the 
last law day.83  In strict foreclosure, there is no statutory redemption; 
rather, the court has the sole discretion to determine the amount of time 
allowed for redemption based upon the equity in the property.84 
In general, strict foreclosure has not been a favored method of 
foreclosure in this country because it is likely to result in surrendering 
the entire property on account of a debt significantly less than the value 
of the real estate itself.85  Currently, strict foreclosure is not allowed in 
most states, but is a permissible method of foreclosure in some.86  This 
form of foreclosure is also recognized in some states as an acceptable 
form of proceeding under special circumstances, but states are careful 
only to allow it when it is not calculated to prejudice any of the involved 
parties’ interests.87  Strict foreclosure by entry and possession has been 
characterized as a “concomitant of the title theory of mortgages,” 
making absolute the title which the mortgagee already holds by 
extinguishing the mortgagor’s equity of redemption, and does not work 
under the lien theory of mortgages.88 
2. Foreclosure by Entry 
A unique variation on strict foreclosure exists in Maine, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island.89  Similar to strict 
foreclosure, in terms of vesting an absolute estate in the land in the 
mortgagee, is foreclosure by peaceable entry of the mortgagee upon the 
mortgaged premises, and the mortgagee’s retention of possession 
 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. TIFFANY, supra note 16, § 1518.   
86. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009) (defining strict 
foreclosure, noting that “[t]he use of strict foreclosure is limited to special situations except in 
those few states that permit this remedy generally.”).  TIFFANY, supra note 16, § 1518. 
87. TIFFANY, supra note 16, § 1518; see generally Wornat Dev. Corp. v. Vakalis, 529 
N.E.2d 1329 (Mass. 1988). 
88. Adair v. Kona Corp., 452 P.2d 449, 453 (Haw. 1969) (quoting GEORGE EDWARD 
OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES 908 (1951)) (“Strict foreclosure is 
thought of as . . . as merely destorying [sic] all interest of the mortgagor in the property, 
leaving the mortgagee’s title to it free and clear.  A requirement, therefore, is that the 
mortgagee must have legal title.  Where he has only a legal lien with legal title in the 
mortgagor, it obviously will not work.”).  See also TIFFANY, supra note 16, § 1512; 55 AM. 
JUR. 2D Mortgages § 470 (2007).   
89. 3 PATTON & PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES § 542 (3d ed. 2003). 
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thereafter for a specified time.90  In the case of foreclosure by entry in 
Massachusetts, three years after an open and peaceable entry is made 
upon the mortgaged premises due to a default on the part of the 
mortgagor, a mortgagee acquires an unencumbered title to the property, 
free of the mortgagor’s equity of redemption.91  Thus, once a foreclosure 
by entry has occurred and the three-year period has expired, the 
mortgage no longer exists because the mortgagee then owns both the 
legal and equitable title to the property.92  The statutory provision 
requires that either a memorandum of the entry be made on the mortgage 
deed and signed by the mortgagor or a certificate of entry signed under 
oath by two competent witnesses be made and recorded.93 
In Massachusetts, a foreclosure by entry is commonly made at the 
time a foreclosure by sale is commenced, and a certificate of entry is 
recorded subsequent to the foreclosure deed and affidavit.94  The 
rationale behind employing both methods of foreclosure concurrently is 
that any potential defect in a foreclosure sale becomes irrelevant after the 
three-year right of redemption period expires.95  A consistent notion in 
the realm of foreclosure law is that the mortgagor is entitled to notice of 
the mortgagee’s intention to exercise its right to foreclose on the 
property.96  In a foreclosure by entry and possession, such notice is said 
to be given by recording a certificate or memorandum of the entry in the 
appropriate registry of deeds.97 
3. Foreclosure by Power of Sale 
Within the category of non-judicial foreclosure is the foreclosure by 
power of sale, which is authorized if a power of sale clause is included in 
 
90. TIFFANY, supra note 16, § 1519. 
91. 28 MASS. PRAC., supra note 27, § 10.12; see Swift v. Mendell, 62 Mass. 357, 357 
(1851). 
92. Santiago ex rel. Santiago v. Alba Mgmt., Inc., 928 N.E.2d 359, 364 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2010). 
93. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 18 (2012); Fitchburg Co-op. Bank v. Normandin, 128 
N.E. 415, 416 (Mass. 1920).  
94. 28 MASS. PRAC., supra note 27, § 10.12 (stating that “[i]n such a case, it is 
important to make the entry first before conducting the sale; once the sale is made title passes 
to the high bidder and the mortgagee no longer has anything to convey.”).  See Grabiel v. 
Michelson, 8 N.E.2d 764, 765 (Mass. 1937). 
95. 28 MASS. PRAC., supra note 27, § 10.12.  See e.g., 6 BAXTER DUNAWAY, supra 
note 6, § 69:16.   
96. 3 PATTON & PALOMAR, supra note 88, § 542; see Barnes v. Boardman, 25 N.E. 
623, 624 (Mass. 1890). 
97. 3 PATTON & PALOMAR, supra note 88; see Wornat Dev. Corp. v. Vakalis, 529 
N.E.2d 1329, 1332 (Mass. 1988). 
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the mortgage.98  The foreclosure sale process involves an auction sale of 
the real estate by the mortgage holder without any court supervision.99  
The power of sale foreclosure has advantages from the perspective of the 
mortgagee, including the relatively short period of time required to 
foreclose and the fact that it cuts off the mortgagor’s right of 
redemption.100  In this type of foreclosure, the mortgagor retains the 
equity of redemption up until the property is sold at auction.101  The 
equity of redemption gives the mortgagor the opportunity to discharge 
the mortgage by satisfying the balance on the note and settling any other 
duties owed in the mortgage.102  Therefore, the mortgagor has the chance 
to pay off the amount owed on the note and potentially avoid foreclosure 
any time up until the property is purchased at the foreclosure auction.103 
Foreclosure by power of sale requires a specific procedure in order 
to provide sufficient notice to the mortgagor and other interested parties 
of the mortgagee’s intent to foreclose and sell the real estate at 
auction.104  Not only must the mortgagee abide by the notice requirement 
in order to effectuate the foreclosure by sale, but must also do so to hold 
a party liable for any deficiency between the net proceeds of the 
foreclosure sale and the amount due on the note.105  The notice 
requirement provides, in relevant part, that the mortgagee must send a 
notice to “all persons of record as of 30 days prior to the date of sale 
holding an interest in the property junior to the mortgage being 
foreclosed.”106  Such a requirement ensures that all of the parties 
involved in the foreclosure and the parties interested in purchasing the 
property at the foreclosure sale will be notified of the impending 
 
98. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009) (defining power-of-sale 
clause as “[a] provision in a mortgage or deed of trust permitting the mortgagee or trustee to 
sell the property without court authority if the payments are not made.”).  
99. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009) (defining power-of-sale 
foreclosure as “[a] foreclosure process by which, according to the mortgage instrument and a 
state statute, the mortgaged property is sold at a non-judicial public sale by a public official, 
the mortgagee, or a trustee.”).  See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009) 
(defining foreclosure sale as “[t]he sale of mortgaged property, authorized by a court decree or 
a power-of-sale clause, to satisfy the debt.”). 
100. 6 BAXTER DUNAWAY, supra note 6, § 69:16. 
101. Ward, supra note 21, at 271.   
102. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 18 (2012); Ward, supra note 21. 
103. Ward, supra note 21. 
104. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 183, § 21 (2012); Ward, supra note 21. 
105. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 14 (2012); 6 BAXTER DUNAWAY, supra note 6, § 
69:21; see Com. v. Bank of Am., No. 11–4363–BLS1, 2012 WL 6062747, 6 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Dec. 3, 2012). 
106. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 14 (2012); 6 BAXTER DUNAWAY, supra note 6, § 
69:21. 
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foreclosure.107 
4. Foreclosure by Action 
A foreclosure by action or judicial foreclosure is extremely rare in 
Massachusetts.108  Such a foreclosure is typically used only when the 
statutory power of sale is unavailable in the terms prescribed in the 
mortgage.109  Due to the fact that it is “[a] costly and time-consuming . . . 
method by which the mortgaged property is sold through a court 
proceeding requiring many standard legal steps,” foreclosure by judicial 
action is rarely used in Massachusetts and some other states.110 
C. Foreclosure Crisis: Happenings, Impact & Continued Ramifications 
The United States foreclosure crisis is an ongoing and unresolved 
situation that began in 2007.111  As a result of this widespread epidemic 
of foreclosures initiated by large corporate lenders, more mortgagors 
have entered the foreclosure process than ever.112  The economic crisis 
engrossing the U.S. began when “large numbers of homeowners 
defaulted on poorly underwritten subprime mortgage loans.”113  The 
mortgage crisis was caused, in part, by the Great Recession and the 
abundance of unemployment, which subsequently led to further financial 
crisis beginning around the year 2008.114  During that initial crisis 
 
107. This notion follows due process norms set out in Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank 
& Trust Co. in terms of notifying the parties.  339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (“An elementary and 
fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality 
is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”).  See 
discussion infra Part II.A, n.143. 
108. Francis J. Nolan, Real Estate Title Practice in Massachusetts, in MASSACHUSETTS 
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION § 17.2 (2013). 
109. Id. 
110. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009) (defining judicial 
foreclosure). 
111. See FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, THE U.S. HOUSING MARKET: CURRENT 
CONDITIONS AND POLICY CONDITIONS 3 (2012), available at http://federal 
reserve.gov/publications/other-reports/files/housing-white-paper-20120104.pdf. 
112. “At the same time, an unprecedented number of households have lost, or are on the 
verge of losing, their homes.”  Id. at 1.  See, e.g., Paul Kiel, The Great American Foreclosure 
Story: The Struggle for Justice and a Place to Call Home, PROPUBLICA, Apr. 10, 2012, 
http://www.propublica.org/article/the-great-american-foreclosure-story-the-struggle-for-
justice-and-a-place-t/single. 
113. Renuart, supra note 67, at 111. 
114. “The Great Recession brought two waves of foreclosure suits.  The first was the 
collapse of the designed-to-fail mortgages frequently arranged by unscrupulous mortgage 
brokers. . . . The unemployment crisis caused the second wave of foreclosures.”  Daniel Bahls 
& Katherine Hunt, Abhorring a Forfeiture: The Importance of Equitable Jurisdiction in a 
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period, banks were becoming extremely aggressive and did not have 
patience for homeowners who fell behind on their mortgage payments.115  
In a three-month period in 2010, there was a fourteen percent increase in 
the number of homeowners receiving default notices.116 
During the years following the initial crisis period in 2008, many 
inconsistencies occurred and, in February of 2012, five of the largest 
mortgage servicers agreed to a settlement with the federal government 
and forty-nine states for their deceptive mortgage practices, known as 
the National Mortgage Settlement.117  This settlement required the 
lenders to provide approximately twenty-six billion dollars in relief to 
distressed homeowners, resulting in the second largest civil settlement in 
U.S. history, following the Tobacco Settlement.118  The gravity of the 
crisis is demonstrated by the fact that by April of 2012, more than four 
million home mortgages had been foreclosed since the crisis began in 
2007.119  Furthermore, in September of 2012, one out of every 248 
households in this country received a notice of foreclosure.120  It is 
important to note that a foreclosure’s impact stretches beyond the 
homeowners by affecting the surrounding neighborhoods and towns as a 
whole.121  Moreover, a foreclosure negatively impacts the sale of homes 
 
Foreclosure Crisis, 41 STETSON L. REV. 779, 784-85 (2012). 
115. “That increase signals banks are moving more aggressively now against borrowers 
who have fallen behind on their mortgage payments than they have since industrywide [sic] 
foreclosure processing problems emerged last fall.”  Sharp Rise in Foreclosures as Banks 
Move in, NBC NEWS (Oct. 13, 2011), http:// www.nbcnews.com/id/44885991/ns/business-
real_estate/t/sharp-rise-foreclosures-banks-move.  See Bahls & Hunt, supra note 113, at 784-
85 (discussing the collapse of the designed-to-fail mortgages frequently arranged by 
unscrupulous mortgage brokers).   
116. “The number of U.S. homes that received a first-time default notice during the July 
to September quarter increased 14 percent compared to the second quarter of the year . . . .”  
Sharp Rise, supra note 114. 
117. Nelson D. Schwartz, & Julie Creswell, Mortgage Plan Gives Billions to 
Homeowners, but With Exceptions, N.Y. TIMES, 9 Feb. 2012, available at, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/10/business/states-negotiate-26-billion-agreement-for-
homeowners.html?hp&_r=0.  
118. Id.  
119. Kiel, supra note 111. 
120. Dan Levy & Prashant Gopal, N.Y. Area Leads Rise in Foreclosure Filings, THE 
SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 25, 2012), available at http://seattletimes.com/html/ 
businesstechnology/2019526047_foreclosuresrealtytracxml.html (“Stockton, Calif., led the 20 
metro areas with the highest rates of foreclosure filings, at one in 67 households, more than 
three times the U.S. average of one in 248.”). 
121. G. THOMAS KINGSLEY ET AL., THE IMPACTS OF FORECLOSURE ON FAMILIES AND 
COMMUNITIES (The Urban Institute 2009), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/ 
411909_impact_of_forclosures.pdf.  (“In some cases, where there are only a few foreclosures 
and steps are taken to minimize the time the properties stand vacant, impacts may be slight.  In 
contrast, where the number of foreclosures is sizeable in a compact area, there may well be 
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in surrounding neighborhoods with the increase in foreclosures causing 
declines in the sale value of neighboring properties.122  In addition, areas 
with higher rates of foreclosure often experience more crime, such as 
abandoned houses being broken into.123  The negative impact of 
foreclosures has led to an extension of the housing crisis.124 
Since the beginning of the foreclosure crisis, there have been many 
changes to protect homeowners in the form of proposed legislation, 
judicial decisions, and programs implemented to provide assistance to 
current mortgagors facing impending foreclosure.125  Most significantly, 
courts have been scrutinizing whether the lending parties initiating 
foreclosures against mortgagors have the right to take this action absent 
the authority to enforce the note and mortgage.126  An example of this 
scrutiny is the recent decision in Massachusetts of U.S. National Bank 
Association v. Ibanez, in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court voided two foreclosure sales because the foreclosing parties did 
not hold the mortgage.127  In Ibanez, the court held that a foreclosure by 
 
strong secondary effects on nearby properties and the impact on the neighborhood as a whole 
can be dramatic.”). 
122. “Housing foreclosures likely have little neighborhood impacts if there are few 
foreclosures in a neighborhood and the foreclosed housing can resell quickly.  However, when 
there are both many foreclosures along with a sluggish housing market, foreclosures can lead 
to neighborhood destabilization, which should cause house prices to further fall.”  William H. 
Rogers & William Winter, The Impact of Foreclosures on Neighboring Housing Sales, 31(4) 
JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH 455-79 (2009), available at 
http://aux.zicklin.baruch.cuny.edu/jrer/ papers/pdf/past/vol31n04/04.455_480.pdf.  G. 
THOMAS KINGSLEY ET AL., supra note 120 (“The Center for Responsible Lending has made 
estimates of possible national and state impacts on property values, . . .They now project that 
around 2.2 million foreclosures of subprime loans will occur primarily in late 2008 through 
the end of 2009, and that 40.6 million homes in neighborhoods will suffer price declines 
averaging $8,667 per home, resulting in a $352 billion total decline in property values.”). 
123. “In 2005 and 2006, there was an annual average of 1.7 violent crime incidents per 
100 houses in high-foreclosure clusters, almost three times the 0.6 average for the comparison 
group.”  G. THOMAS KINGSLEY ET AL., supra note 120, at 18. 
124. “The conventional view among many policy analysts has been that the rising tide 
of foreclosures will cause deep declines in the sales values of neighboring properties, 
extending the housing crisis into local fiscal policy.”  Rogers & Winter, supra note 121, at 
455-79. 
125. Avoiding Foreclosure, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING AND URBAN DEV. (Nov. 3, 2013), 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/topics/avoiding_foreclosure (“Home Affordable 
Modification Program (HAMP): HAMP lowers your monthly mortgage payment to 31 percent 
of your verified monthly gross (pre-tax) income to make your payments more affordable.”) 
(“Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP): If you are current on your mortgage and 
have been unable to obtain a traditional refinance because the value of your home has 
declined, you may be eligible to refinance through HARP . . . designed to help you refinance 
into a new affordable, more stable mortgage.”). 
126. Renuart, supra note 67, at 111. 
127. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 55 (Mass. 2011); see Renuart, 
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power of sale must adhere strictly to the statutory requirements, 
especially that the mortgagee be the holder of the mortgage at the time it 
moves to foreclose.128  The decision in Ibanez is one of many in 
Massachusetts that has held that in order to foreclose under the power of 
sale, the mortgagee must strictly adhere to the relevant statutes.129  Based 
upon the dicta in the relevant decisions and the recent legislative reforms 
requiring lenders to act in good faith and take reasonable precautionary 
steps in order to avoid foreclosure, it seems as though Ibanez is the 
beginning of an era of protecting homeowners.130 
II. PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS SURROUNDING THE FORECLOSURE BY 
ENTRY PROVISION 
Let us think again about the hypothetical example outlined in the 
Introduction.  Mary, the young widowed mother with five small 
children, working three jobs, was faced with foreclosure due to her 
failure to procure homeowners insurance.  The lending institution 
decided to foreclose by entry and possession.  Mary was not actually 
made aware of the entry because it was made late at night.  After three 
years passed, Mary received a letter indicating that the three-year equity 
of redemption on the real estate had been foreclosed, and that she should 
vacate the land.  This section of the Note analyzes the policy concerns 
that are raised when such a major property interest is affected without 
making the mortgaging homeowner truly cognizant of the approaching 
foreclosure. 
A. Recording of the Certificate—Sufficient Notice to the Mortgagor? 
In 1975, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated that it 
did not seem possible for a foreclosure to be made without the mortgagor 
having first received some form of notice of the proposed foreclosure 
and an opportunity to defend against it.131  This notion promotes fairness 
to a mortgagor, given that the mortgagor’s equity of redemption in the 
 
supra note 67. 
128. Renuart, supra note 67, at 143.  See U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 941 N.E.2d 40. 
129. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 55; see Eaton v. Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass’n, 969 N.E.2d 
1118, 1126 (Mass. 2012); Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d 884, 892 (Mass. 2011). 
130. Renuart, supra note 67, at 158.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, §§ 35A, 35B 
(2012).  See Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 50 (where the court emphasized the significance of the 
requirement that the mortgagee give notice to the mortgagor, stating “[t]he manner in which 
the notice of the proposed sale shall be given is one of the important terms of the power, and 
a strict compliance with it is essential to the valid exercise of the power,” and noting that the 
“mortgagor is entitled to know who is foreclosing.”). 
131. Beaton v. Land Court, 326 N.E.2d 302, 307 (Mass. 1975). 
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property is at stake.  Indeed, over a century earlier, in Thayer v. Smith, 
the court held that the entry of a mortgagee was not sufficient to 
commence a foreclosure without actual notice to the mortgagor, or open 
and continued possession.132  However, as the statute currently reads, 
there is no requirement that a mortgagee actually notify the mortgagor of 
an entry.133  All that is required is that the certificate or memorandum be 
recorded.134 
Ordinarily, a mortgagor is entitled to receive notice of the 
mortgagee’s intention to exercise his or her right to foreclose the 
mortgage on the property, given in compliance with statutory 
requirements.135  However, a mortgagee in actual occupation after breach 
of condition has a right to enter peaceably in the presence of witnesses to 
foreclose without actually notifying the mortgagor of his intention to do 
so or of the fact that it has been done.136  This is because compliance 
with the statute and recording the certificate or memorandum of entry 
allegedly provides constructive notice to all persons involved.137  The 
Massachusetts statutory provision governing foreclosure by open and 
peaceable entry and possession provides: 
A mortgagee may, after breach of condition of a mortgage of land, 
recover possession of the land mortgaged by an open and peaceable 
entry thereon, if not opposed by the mortgagor or other person 
claiming it, or by action under this chapter; and possession so 
obtained, if continued peaceably for three years from the date of 
recording of the memorandum or certificate as provided in section 
two, shall forever foreclose the right of redemption.138 
Nowhere in the statute does it expressly state that actual notice must be 
sent or presented to the mortgagor.139  The statutory provision regarding 
the certificate of entry provides in relevant part: 
[A] memorandum of the entry shall be made on the mortgage deed 
and signed by the mortgagor or person claiming under him, or a 
certificate, under oath, of two competent witnesses to prove the entry 
 
132. Thayer v. Smith, 17 Mass. 429, 429 (1821). 
133. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 1 (2012); 5 MASS. PRAC., Methods Of Practice § 
13:11 (4th ed. 2000); see Joyner v. Lenox Sav. Bank, 76 N.E.2d 169, 174 (Mass. 1947). 
134. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 1 (2012); 5 MASS. PRAC., supra note 133, § 13:11; 
see Joyner, 76 N.E.2d at 174. 
135. 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 726 (2009); see Barnes v. Boardman, 25 N.E. 623 (Mass. 
1890). 
136. 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 726 (2009); see Hobbs v. Fuller, 75 Mass. 98, 98 (1857). 
137. 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 726 (2009); see Joyner, 76 N.E.2d at 175. 
138. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 1 (2012). 
139. Id. 
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shall be made. Such memorandum or certificate shall after the 
entry . . . be recorded in the registry of deeds for the county or 
district where the land lies . . . .140 
Thus, in order for a foreclosure by entry to be effective, either: (1) 
the memorandum must be entered on the mortgage and signed by the 
mortgagor, which provides actual notice, or (2) the certificate must be 
recorded in the registry of deeds, which supposedly provides 
constructive notice to the parties involved of the impending 
foreclosure.141 
In Fletcher v. Cary, the court held that the recording of the 
certificate of entry “is a full and authoritative notice to all persons of the 
fact and date of the mortgagee’s peaceable entry” as well as the 
mortgagee’s intent to foreclose the property.142  The Fletcher court 
supported its analysis by stating that “[i]t is not an entry for the purpose 
of literally ousting and expelling the mortgagor . . . it is for the purpose 
of giving ‘ample and full notice to the mortgagor that his right of 
redeeming will be gone in three years.’”143  The court went so far as to 
state that so long as the entry is duly recorded, “it is wholly immaterial 
whether the owner of the equity of redemption had actual knowledge of 
it or not.”144  Further, over a century later, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts reaffirmed this notion in holding that the recorded 
certificate of entry required by statute provides sufficient notice of the 
mortgagee’s intent to foreclose by entry and possession.145  This line of 
authority begs the question whether, in fact, this method of giving notice 
to the mortgagor through recording of a certificate at the registry of 
deeds does give ample and full notice to the mortgagor of the impending 
foreclosure. 
As Massachusetts follows the title theory of mortgages, the 
mortgagee holds the legal title to the mortgaged property, and the 
mortgagor retains an equity of redemption in the property.146  The 
statutory provisions, giving a considerable time after the entry is made in 
which the real estate may be redeemed, are said to mitigate the severity 
of foreclosing by an open and peaceable entry as opposed to foreclosure 
 
140. Id. § 2. 
141. Id. 
142. Fletcher v. Cary, 103 Mass. 475, 477 (1870). 
143. Id. at 477. 
144. Id. at 478. 
145. Wornat Dev. Corp. v. Vakalis, 529 N.E.2d 1329, 1332 (Mass. 1988). 
146. Araserv, Inc. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass’n, Inc., 437 F. 
Supp. 1083, 1092 (D. Mass. 1977). 
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by power of sale.147  In Massachusetts, there is a three-year period 
following the initial entry in which the mortgagor may seek to redeem 
his rights in the property before his equity of redemption is forever 
foreclosed.148  Although three years seems to be a fair allowance for a 
redemption period, this would not effectively act as a mitigating factor if 
the mortgagor is never made aware of the entry itself.  Arguably, a 
mortgagor who stops paying on a mortgage and never attempts to cure 
the default with the mortgagee would likely be aware that his or her real 
estate might be foreclosed upon.  In addition, it is possible that if a 
power of sale foreclosure is executed at the same time as a foreclosure 
by entry, the mortgagor could conceivably have inquiry notice of the 
latter.149  However, it is also possible that a mortgagor could default in 
some other way in which he or she may not be as aware of the possibility 
of foreclosure, such as not renewing the insurance on the property, in 
which case the redemption period would not serve its intended 
purpose.150 
After a mortgagor’s breach of a condition of the mortgage, “an 
entry or an attempt to gain possession on the part of the mortgagee is 
presumed to be for the purpose of foreclosure.”151  Therefore, if a 
mortgagor in breach of a condition of the mortgage were to witness the 
mortgagee entering upon the property in the presence of two witnesses, 
the mortgagor could presume that it is for the purpose to foreclose.152  
Furthermore, due to the fact that the statutory provision allows for a 
memorandum on the mortgage signed by the mortgagor, it is also 
possible for the mortgagor to gain notice of the foreclosure by signing 
that memorandum.153  However, it seems that the majority of foreclosure 
by entry cases involve a certificate signed in the presence of two 
 
147. TIFFANY, supra note 16, § 1519; see Frankowich v. Szczuka, 71 N.E.2d 761 
(Mass. 1947).  
148. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 1 (2012). 
149. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009) (defining inquiry notice 
as “[n]otice attributed to a person when the information would lead an ordinarily prudent 
person to investigate the matter further.”).  However, this could be discounted by the notion of 
an ordinarily prudent person.  Such a person might assume that if they are only made aware of 
the foreclosure executed under the power of sale in their mortgage, that that is the extent of the 
foreclosure proceedings with which they are a party of. 
150. This is akin to the situation in the hypothetical example given in the Introduction, 
where a mortgaging homeowner does not re-procure insurance on the mortgaged real estate.  
See discussion supra Introduction. 
151. Walker v. Thayer, 113 Mass. 36, 38-39 (1873). 
152. Id. at 36. 
153. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, §§ 1, 2 (2012); see Fitchburg Co-op. Bank v. 
Normandin, 128 N.E. 415, 415-16 (Mass. 1920). 
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witnesses rather than a memorandum signed by the mortgagor.154  
Therefore, by default, recording a certificate of entry is the more 
prevalent method, and thus the likelihood that the mortgagor would be 
put on notice is decreased.155 
In the more recent decision of Pellegrini v. Silva, the Massachusetts 
Appellate Court affirmed the notion that the recorded certificate of entry 
required by statute is ample notice of the mortgagee’s intent to foreclose 
by entry and possession.156  In support of its decision, the court reasoned 
that the mortgagors, as landowners, had a duty to monitor their title.157  
Moreover, the court noted that, “[f]or more than [one hundred fifty] 
years, courts in the Commonwealth have repeatedly affirmed that a duly 
recorded entry is sufficient notice under this statute.”158  The alleged 
constructive notice that stems from the recording of the certificate of 
entry is in contrast to actual notice, which is required by statute for 
foreclosures by power of sale.159  The object of the provision regarding 
the memorandum or certificate necessary to effectuate a foreclosure by 
entry is to give notice to all persons involved.160  However, based upon 
both the available case law and notions of common sense, it seems as 
though providing this type of purported constructive notice does not 
accomplish the task of delivering notice to all parties, and that actual 
notice should in fact be required.161 
 
154. See 28 MASS. PRAC., supra note 27, § 10.1 (offering a checklist for conducting a 
foreclosure under a statutory power of sale, including having an “officer or mortgagee make 
entry onto the property before two witnesses and execute a Certificate of Entry attesting the 
same.”). 
155. Id. 
156. Pellegrini v. Silva, 876 N.E.2d 498 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007). 
157. Id. 
158. Id.  
159. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 14 (2012) (“The mortgagee . . . may . . . perform all 
acts authorized or required by the power of sale; provided, however, that no sale . . . shall be 
effectual to foreclose a mortgage, unless, previous to such sale, notice of the sale has been 
published once in each of 3 successive weeks, . . . in a newspaper published in the city or town 
where the land lies . . . and notice of the sale has been sent by registered mail to the owner or 
owners of record of the equity of redemption as of 30 days prior to the date of sale . . . .”).  
However, it is questionable whether the recording act requires the homeowner to check for the 
presence of such certificates.  
160. Lennon v. Porter, 71 Mass. 318, 319 (1855).  If a contractor were to file a 
mechanics lien against a property, most states require that before the mechanics lien can be 
attached the contractor must give notice of the lien to the homeowner.  28 MASS. PRAC., supra 
note 27, § 11.18.  It would seem logical to require the same actual notice requirement for 
attaching a certificate of entry to effectuate a foreclosure on mortgaged property. 
161. It has been argued that not only does the foreclosure by entry provision unfairly 
burden mortgagors, but also that “[a]s it is presently practiced in Massachusetts, with the 
sanction of our state courts, foreclosure by entry violates the constitutional principle of 
fundamental fairness . . . . [and that] [t]here must be at least actual ‘reasonable notice’ to the 
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Furthermore, the view that lay homeowners can and should 
periodically check the record title for their property at the registry of 
deeds is not realistic.162  As a practical matter, absent some specific 
reason to check the record title of their property, ordinary people do not 
make it a custom to consult the registry of deeds records concerning their 
property.163  Requiring mortgagors to continually refer to the registry of 
deeds to guarantee that there is no certificate of entry recorded on their 
property to ensure that they are not the subject of an impending 
foreclosure “is akin to requiring citizens check court dockets periodically 
to learn whether they have been sued, in lieu of requiring service of civil 
process on each defendant.”164  This is an interesting comparison, and in 
fact, is a strong parallel lending weight to the assertion that burdening 
the homeowner with such a responsibility is simply not realistic. 
In the arena of foreclosure, where such a fundamental property right 
is at stake, it seems fairly apparent that the mortgagor should receive 
actual notice165 of the institution of a foreclosure by entry and the 
beginning of the ensuing three-year redemption period.  In order to 
establish actual notice to all parties involved in the foreclosure by entry 
process, usually consisting predominantly of the mortgagor(s), the use of 
personal service or certified mail service can be required.166  
 
borrower that a foreclosure by entry is about to occur.” 28 MASS. PRAC., supra note 27, § 
10.12; see e.g., Snyder v. Com. of Mass., 291 U.S. 97, 127-28 (1934) (“[W]hether it affect 
property or liberty or life, the Fourteenth Amendment commands the observance of that 
standard of common fairness, . . . It is fundamental that there can be no due process without 
reasonable notice and a fair hearing.”).  Furthermore, in Pellegrini v. Silva, the court held that 
because the mortgagee satisfied the notice requirements of the statute, the case presented “no 
occasion to determine whether the due process clause even has any applicability to non-
judicial mortgage foreclosures.”  876 N.E.2d 498 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007). 
162. 28 MASS. PRAC., supra note 27, § 10.12; see Pellegrini, 876 N.E.2d (“[T]he 
Silvas, as landowners, had a duty to monitor their title.  Pellegrini had no duty to provide 
notice beyond that required by the governing statute.”). 
163. 28 MASS. PRAC., supra note 27, § 10.12 (“Unless there is some specific reason to 
do so, (such as a pending sale, refinance, construction loan disbursement, or perhaps some 
perceived danger of attachment or levy on execution), ordinary people do not as a practical 
matter make it a habit to consult registry of deeds records concerning their property.”). 
164. Id.  See Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 223 (2006) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), holding that “[b]efore a State may take 
property and sell it for unpaid taxes, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires the government to provide the owner ‘notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate 
to the nature of the case.’”).  As the same fundamental right to property is at stake in the realm 
of taxation as well as foreclosure, it allows for the inference that the same notice requirement 
should be applied.  
165. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009) (defining actual notice as 
“[n]otice given directly to, or received personally by, a party.”). 
166. 28 MASS. PRAC., supra note 27, § 10.12.  See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
719 (9th ed. 2009) (defining personal service as “[a]ctual delivery of the notice or process to 
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B. Should There Be a Time Limit on Recording the Certificate? 
The Massachusetts foreclosure by entry provision was developed 
early on and has gone through extensive changes in its requirements.167  
Prior to 1785, any lawful entry by the mortgagee after a broken 
condition and the lapse of three years worked a foreclosure.168  At that 
point, it was provided that the mortgagor might redeem, unless the 
mortgagee had entered in presence of two witnesses, and continued in 
peaceable possession for three years.169  Up until 1991, there was an 
added requirement, which provided that “a certificate under oath of two 
competent witnesses shall be made and recorded within 30 days of the 
entry.”170  With this time limit imposed on the recording of the certificate 
of entry, if the certificate was recorded more than thirty days following 
the date of entry, the entry was invalidated, and any subsequent 
foreclosure relying on that entry was ineffectual.171 
By amendment in 1991, however, the time limits for recording the 
mortgagee’s affidavit and/or the certificate of entry have been 
removed.172  Therefore, the three-year redemption period for certificates 
of entry to cure sale defects does not begin to run until the certificate is 
in fact recorded, no matter when that occurs.173  This concept seems to 
disadvantage the mortgagor because it gives absolute control to the 
mortgagee in regards to when to record the certificate, which begins the 
three-year redemption period.174  Due to the fact that the mortgagor 
 
the person to whom it is directed.”).  See Receipt for Certified Mail, USPS.COM 
https://store.usps.com/store/browse/productDetailSingleSku.jsp?productId=P_FORM_3800&c
ategoryId=priority-mail (last visited Mar. 25, 2015) (providing that the receipt for certified 
mail provides the sender with “a mailing receipt and, upon request electronic verification that 
an article was delivered or that a delivery attempt was made.”).  By requiring the use of 
personal service or certified mail it would ensure that the mortgaging homeowner is actually 
made aware of the approaching foreclosure and thus the three-year period of redemption.   
167. See Mortgages—Foreclosure—Recordation, Mass. Legis. Serv. Ch. 157 (H.B. 
5752) (1991).  See generally Nolan, supra note 107, § 17.4.1.  See Swift v. Mendell, 62 Mass. 
357, 359 (1851).   
168. Whitney v. Guild, 77 Mass. 496, 501 (1860). 
169. Id. at 501. 
170. Fitchburg Co-op. Bank v. Normandin, 128 N.E. 415, 416 (Mass. 1920).  See 
Mortgages—Foreclosure—Recordation, Mass. Legis. Serv. Ch. 157 (H.B. 5752) (1991). 
171. See Fitchburg Co-op. Bank, 128 N.E. at 416. 
172. See Mortgages—Foreclosure—Recordation, Mass. Legis. Serv. Ch. 157 (H.B. 
5752) (1991). 
173. 15A MASS. PRAC., Mortgage § 28:82 (4th ed. 2008).  “Prior to 1991, the 
mortgagee was required to record the certificate of entry within thirty days . . . . Currently, a 
delay in the recording of a certificate of entry only serves to delay the start of the three-year 
redemption period.”  NOLAN, supra note 107, § 17.4.1. 
174. The statute does not include a limitation on when the mortgagee is able to record 
the certificate of entry, which gives way for the inference that the mortgagee remains in 
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could stand to lose their stake in the property, it would seem reasonable 
to allow for either the redemption period to begin running on the date of 
the entry,175 or to require the certificate to be recorded within a specified 
period from the date of the entry.176  Therefore, the fact that there is no 
longer a requirement to record the certificate of entry at the time of the 
entry or soon thereafter adds preventable uncertainty and difficulty in 
providing notice to the mortgagor.177 
III.  STATUTORY ISSUES REGARDING THE FORECLOSURE BY ENTRY 
PROVISION 
Chapter 244, sections one and two of the Massachusetts General 
Laws, which allow for the entry of a mortgagee upon the premises for 
breach of a condition of the mortgage and for the purpose of foreclosure, 
require an entry be “peaceable” and “open.”178  It is usually stated that 
the entry “is peaceable if not opposed by the mortgagor or other person 
claiming the premises; and . . . open if made in the presence of two 
competent witnesses whose certificate thereof is sworn to and duly 
recorded . . . where the land lies.”179  Under this view, the entry is 
“peaceable” if unopposed by the mortgagor and “open” if made in the 
presence of two competent witnesses.180  Both of these statutory 
requirements have been interpreted fairly broadly.181 
A. The Open and Peaceable Entry: Just What Does it Entail? 
The statute provides that a mortgagor may make an open and 
peaceable entry upon the mortgaged property if not opposed by the 
 
control of the process. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 2 (2012). 
175. This would seem to be a just resolution only if the mortgagor signed the 
memorandum, which would ensure that the mortgagor received actual notice of the entry. 
176. This requirement would apply if the certificate of entry was used. 
177. A time limit on the recording of the certificate seems to be a good provision that 
was removed because without it, one could imagine a scenario where a homeowner witnesses 
the mortgagee making an entry and immediately goes to check the registry of deeds but sees 
nothing recorded.  The homeowner periodically consults the registry over the next few weeks, 
and still nothing is recorded, and the mortgagor subsequently forgets about the entry.  Then, 
several years later, the mortgagee could take the certificate of entry that was produced but not 
yet recorded, record it, and then three years from that date, the foreclosure would be 
effectuated. 
178. Thompson v. Kenyon, 100 Mass. 108, 108 (1868); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 2 
(2012). 
179. Thompson, 100 Mass. at 108; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 2. 
180. Thompson, 100 Mass. at 108; 14C MASS. PRAC., supra note 24, § 15.129. 
181. See discussion supra Introduction, note 12; Ellis v. Drake, 90 Mass. 161, 163 
(1864) (where the mortgage was found to have been successfully foreclosed by entry and 
possession even though the entry was made in secret during the nighttime). 
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mortgagor or other person claiming the premises.182  What constitutes 
open and peaceable and what it takes to oppose the mortgagee is left 
open-ended and leaves such interpretation open for a case-by-case 
analysis.183  Not only does this provide for much confusion in terms of 
construing the statute, but also the lack of direction from the legislature 
prevents administrative ease that is desired from a statute.184 
An entry on one of multiple lots included within the same mortgage 
has proven sufficient to satisfy the entry requirement of the statute, even 
though the properties may be distant from each other.185  Therefore, 
because in such a situation the mortgagor cannot be present at all of the 
locations, it leaves open the possibility that the mortgagor would be 
completely unaware of the so-called “open” entry.  Furthermore, it is no 
valid objection to an entry that it was made in the nighttime, and an entry 
may also be upheld even if carried out in secret.186  By allowing for such 
seemingly secret entries to satisfy the openness requirement of the 
statute, mortgagees are significantly advantaged as they may institute a 
foreclosure without the mortgagor’s knowledge.187  Further, an analysis 
of these outcomes leaves one wondering what constitutes an entry that is 
not open if an entry done at night or in secret satisfies the requirement of 
openness.188 
In Walker v. Thayer, the mortgagee was found not to have entered 
with force and violence when a crow bar was used to remove the 
window fasteners on the mortgagor’s house.189  However, the 
mortgagor’s resistance to such entry, which included throwing hot water 
at the mortgagee and hitting him with a stick, was found to be sufficient 
to oppose the entry.190  This case seems to leave open for interpretation 
the issue of what constitutes a “non-peaceable” entry if effectively 
breaking into the premises was found to be peaceable.191  Further, the 
 
182. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 1 (2012); Walker v. Thayer, 113 Mass. 36, 39 
(1873). 
183. See discussion of Walker v. Thayer supra Introduction, note13. 
184. ANNE WAGNER & SOPHIE CACCIAGUIDI-FAHY, OBSCURITY AND CLARITY IN THE 
LAW: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES xiii (2008) (stating that “[i]t is important to note that the 
concept of clarity has progressively moved to the mainstream of legal scholarship.”). 
185. Ellis v. Drake, 90 Mass. 161, 163 (1864). 
186. Id. at 163; Fletcher v. Cary, 103 Mass. 475, 477 (1870). 
187. Ellis, 90 Mass. at 163 (entry on the premises was made in secret during the 
nighttime, and was upheld as a valid entry).  A mortgagor would not be aware of such an entry 
as it was purposely done covertly. 
188. Id. at 163; Fletcher, 103 Mass. at 477. 
189. Walker v. Thayer, 113 Mass. 36, 38 (1873). 
190. Id. at 38. 
191. Id. at 38. 
BRITTANI MORGAN 7/13/15  7:05 PM 
118 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37: 91 
case law is not clear as to whether anything less aggressive than 
throwing boiling water at the mortgagee will constitute a sufficient 
opposition.192  These situations present the problem that a mortgagor 
cannot oppose an entry of which he or she is unaware due to the fact that 
the entry is made at night, in secret, or on a different tract of land held by 
the mortgagor under the same mortgage.  It follows logically that in 
order for a mortgagor to effectively oppose the mortgagee’s entry, the 
mortgagor must first be aware of the entry. 
The courts’ longstanding holdings regarding the “open and 
peaceable entry” requirement seem to give an overbroad definition of 
both terms.193  Moreover, the relevant cases on this issue date back to the 
eighteenth century, and it seems as though much of the case law is 
simply outdated.194 
B. What, if Anything, Interrupts Such Possession Gained Through 
Entry? 
The current rule of law seems to hold that, “the entry by the 
mortgagee for condition broken, in the presence of two witnesses, and a 
certificate thereof duly sworn to . . . and duly recorded, are all that is 
necessary to effect a foreclosure.”195  In fact, cases that have interpreted 
the foreclosure by entry statute “have long held that a mortgagee who 
has made peaceful entry on the property and duly recorded a certificate 
of entry need not do anything further to establish possession.”196  Thus, it 
has been held that once an entry is made, in the absence of anything to 
the contrary, it can be assumed that the mortgagee’s possession was 
sufficient to satisfy the statute.197  The Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts198 established that the possession the mortgagee is 
required to acquire and maintain to effectuate a foreclosure by entry is 
not a personal occupation of the mortgaged estate by himself.199  The 
statutory requirements have been characterized as “a formal entry, and a 
 
192. Id. at 38. 
193. See discussion supra Introduction, note 12; discussion supra Part III, note 180. 
194. See, e.g., Walker v. Thayer, 113 Mass. 36 (1873); Ellis v. Drake, 90 Mass. 161 
(1864); Lennon v. Porter, 71 Mass. 318 (1855); Bennett v. Conant, 64 Mass. 163, 167 (1852); 
Fay v. Valentine, 22 Mass. 418, 425 (1827); Skinner v. Brewer, 21 Mass. 468 (1827); Thayer 
v. Smith, 17 Mass. 429 (1821). 
195. Ellis, 90 Mass. at 163-64. 
196. HS Land Trust LLC v. Gonzalez, No. 11 MISC. 446482(KCL), 2012 WL 
5362885, *2 (Mass. Land Ct. Oct. 30, 2012). 
197. Singh v. 207-211 Main St., LLC, 937 N.E.2d 977, 978 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010). 
198. Hereinafter “SJC.” 
199. Fletcher v. Cary, 103 Mass. 475, 477 (1870). 
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constructive rather than a literal taking of possession.”200 
Due to the fact that actual physical possession by the mortgagee is 
not required,201 it is hard to imagine what the mortgagor can do to defend 
against or oust the mortgagee’s possession.  In fact, in HS Land Trust 
LLC v. Gonzalez, a judge of the Massachusetts Land Court held that the 
mortgagee was able to establish possession despite the fact that for 
nearly two decades, he never resided on the property, paid no taxes, 
purchased no insurance, collected no rent, and the property had been 
conveyed several times.202  Therefore, HS Land Trust LLC reaffirmed 
that entering upon the property and recording its certificate of entry is all 
that is necessary for a mortgagee to establish possession of the 
mortgaged property.203   
The judge reasoned that because the mortgagee had fulfilled both of 
those requirements, it did all it was required by law to do.204  The court 
reasoned that once the mortgagee had successfully acquired possession 
by making an entry and recording the necessary certificate, “[the] 
possession [then] continue[d] until the mortgagor [took] some act that 
[was] adverse to the mortgagee’s possession.”205  The judge held that the 
mortgagee was not required to do anything more than what was done, 
and that the mortgagee’s inaction could not be construed as an intent to 
waive the rights it gained by making a peaceable entry.206 
However, over a century earlier in Lennon v. Porter, the SJC held it 
was well established that “a mortgagor, especially after entry, cannot 
disseize his mortgagee, or defeat his right of possession.”207  The court 
went on to state that “[a]ll such acts are held to be done in subordination 
to the title of his mortgagee.”208  Yet in the same opinion, the court 
stated that the object of the foreclosure by entry provision is to “give 
notice to all persons concerned . . . after such entry, and the lapse of 
three years therefrom, if no steps are taken to redeem, the mortgagee’s 
estate becomes absolute, and all who claim under the original 
 
200. Id. at 477. 
201. This is inferred from the lack of an actual notice requirement in the statute. MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 1 (2012). 
202. HS Land Trust LLC v. Gonzalez, No. 11 MISC. 446482(KCL), 2012 WL 
5362885, *2 (Mass. Land Ct. Oct. 30, 2012). 
203. Id. at 2. 
204. Id.  
205. Id.  
206. Id. at 2-3.   
207. Lennon v. Porter, 71 Mass. 318, 320 (1855). 
208. Id. at 320. (It seems that the SJC in Lennon stated nothing could be done by the 
mortgagor to defeat the mortgagee’s possession after an entry.  However, in HS Land Trust 
LLC, the Land Court held possession continues until an adverse act by the mortgagor).  No. 11 
MISC. 446482(KCL), 2012 WL 5362885, *3 (Mass. Land Ct. Oct. 30, 2012). 
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mortgagor . . . are barred.”209  A few years prior to the decision in Swift 
was that of Ayres v. Waite, in which the court pointed to the dictum 
found in Cholmondely v. Clinton, 2 Meriv. 360, stating, 
[T]hat the mortgagor cannot disseise the mortgagee, because, . . . the 
mortgagor’s possession is not properly his own, but that of the 
mortgagee. The seisin of the mortgagor, although his own for some 
purposes, is the seisin of the mortgagee, in what regards their 
reciprocal relations and rights; and the disseisin of the mortgagor is 
the disseisin of the mortgagee.210 
Therefore, both of these cases, from 1855 and 1852 respectively, firmly 
commanded the proposition that there was nothing a mortgagor could do 
to disturb the mortgagee’s possession.211  This apparent discrepancy 
within the decision in Lennon and between it and the court in HS Land 
Trust emphasizes the need for clarification.212 
However, the apparent discrepancy between the two 
aforementioned holdings seems to be resolved in part by the case of 
Holmes v. Turner’s Falls Lumber Co., which stated that to constitute a 
disseisin of a mortgagee by a mortgagor, it must be made known to the 
mortgagee that the mortgagor or his grantees made some claim adverse 
to the mortgagee.213  The court noted in their opinion that there were 
expressions in its reports to the effect that a mortgagor cannot disseise 
his mortgagee.214  Yet, the court reasoned that the statement of the law 
generally made is that “neither the mortgagor nor his grantee holds 
adversely to the mortgagee until he has distinctly disclaimed holding 
under him, and asserted title in himself.”215  Therefore, the court seems 
to have noticeably recognized that previous decisions had stated that the 
mortgagor could not do anything to disseize the mortgagee, and held to 
the contrary that the mortgagor could in fact establish an adverse holding 
to the mortgagee.216 
Additionally, in Long v. Richards, the court addressed the apparent 
inconsistency, noting that it “would be odd if statutory language, which 
seems so clearly to require possession of a kind which is recognized as 
capable of interruption, should be held to have created a purely fictitious 
 
209. Lennon, 71 Mass. at 319. 
210. Ayres v. Waite, 64 Mass. 72, 74-75 (1852). 
211. Lennon, 71 Mass. at 320; Ayres, 64 Mass. at 74-75. 
212. Lennon, 71 Mass. at 320; HS Land Trust LLC, 2012 WL 5362885 at *2-3. 
213. Holmes v. Turner’s Falls Lumber Co., 23 N.E. 305, 310 (Mass. 1890). 
214. Id. at 310. 
215. Id. at 310-11 (emphasis added) (quoting EMORY WASHBURN ET AL., A TREATISE 
ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 154 (5th ed. 1887). 
216. Id. at 310. 
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and constructive possession, with which no one could interfere.”217  
However, the court in Long went on to state, “we take the tradition of the 
court as we find it, and, on any question of title, apply it as it has been 
applied.”218  It seems that the court in Long realized that not only was 
there noticeable disconnect between the longstanding court holdings and 
logic, but also that the consistently upheld notion of the unbeatable 
possession simply did not make sense.219 
In Beaton v. Land Court, the court noted that even if the mortgagor 
violates the conditions of the mortgage and the mortgagee commences 
foreclosure proceedings, the mortgagor still might redeem the mortgaged 
property and obtain an accounting by appropriate proceedings before the 
foreclosure is completed.220  Moreover, this issue was discussed in the 
more recent case of Pellegrini v. Silva, where it was held to be the 
mortgagor’s responsibility to file suit or otherwise oppose the 
mortgagee’s occupancy during the three-year period after the mortgagee 
recorded notice of her entry in order for the mortgagee’s possession to be 
interrupted.221  Therefore, the current interpretation of the possession 
requirement of the foreclosure by entry provision is that the mortgagor is 
able to overcome the mortgagee’s possession.222  However, what 
constitutes such requisite opposition by the mortgagor is far from 
clear.223  As neither the statutory provisions nor the relevant case law 
describes just what an act adverse to the mortgagee is, the issue lends 
itself to a case-by-case analysis in which certain acts of the mortgagor 
are determined to be adverse to the mortgagee or not.224  Further, with all 
that is needed to meet the requirements being an entry and recording of a 
certificate, it seems as though it would be rather simple for the 
mortgagee to establish possession without actual notice to the mortgagor 
and nearly impossible for the mortgagor to interrupt such acquired 
possession.225 
 
217. Long v. Richards, 48 N.E. 1083, 1086 (Mass. 1898). 
218. Id. at 1086. 
219. Id. at 1086. 
220. Beaton v. Land Court, 326 N.E.2d 302, 307 (Mass. 1975). 
221. Pellegrini v. Silva, 876 N.E.2d 498, n.4 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007). 
222. Id. at n.4. 
223. See discussion supra Introduction, note 13. 
224. See generally HS Land Trust LLC v. Gonzalez, No. 11 MISC. 446482(KCL), 2012 
WL 5362885 (Mass. Land Ct. Oct. 30, 2012) (mortgagor’s continued possession for over 
eighteen years was found not to be adverse to the mortgagee); Bennett v. Conant, 64 Mass. 
163 (1852) (mortgagee’s allowing the mortgagor to continue in possession of the real estate 
was found not to be adverse to the mortgagee’s possession). 
225. The relevant holdings have recognized entries made in secret and unbeknownst to 
the mortgagor, and case law does not articulate any standard test or factors that need to be met 
in order to constitute acts adverse to the mortgagee’s possession.  See e.g., Ellis v. Drake, 90 
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In Pellegrini v. Silva, the occurrence of disputes between the 
mortgagor and mortgagee, and the fact that the mortgagee was in 
possession of the property before the date upon which she began the 
foreclosure by entry, did not render her entry defective under the 
statute.226  Additionally, allowing the mortgagor to remain on the 
mortgaged premises has been held not to be adverse to the mortgagee’s 
possession.227  The court in Bennett v. Conant went further to state that 
after an entry should the mortgagee permit the mortgagor to occupy such 
premises, as a matter of lenience or mutual convenience, without any 
agreement to waive the entry, “the mortgagor must be taken to be the 
tenant at will228 of the mortgagee.”229  Hence, the possession of the 
mortgagor would, in effect, be for the possession of the mortgagee, and 
therefore not adverse as it would not interrupt the continuity of the 
mortgagee’s legal possession.230  Thus, if the mortgagor continues in 
possession of the premises, he is but a sort of tenant at sufferance to the 
mortgagee because that possession of the mortgagor is merely 
permissive and at sufferance of the mortgagee.231 
Likewise, in Cunningham v. Davis, the court reaffirmed that after 
such an entry to foreclose, the mortgagor and those claiming under him 
became tenants at sufferance of the mortgagee.232  The court noted that 
in the absence of any evidence of an adverse holding, the mortgagor and 
those claiming under him are assumed to hold under the mortgagee, and 
that their possession is his during the three years until the completion of 
the foreclosure.233   
In Swift v. Mendell, the court noted that there was no importance in 
the fact that there was no change in the mortgagor’s occupation of the 
land.234  The court reasoned that there is an obvious distinction between 
 
Mass. 161 (1864); Lennon v. Porter, 71 Mass. 318 (1855); Bennett, 64 Mass. at 167; Fay v. 
Valentine, 22 Mass. 418, 425 (1827); Skinner v. Brewer, 21 Mass. 468 (1827); Thayer v. 
Smith, 17 Mass. 429 (1821); Singh v. 207-211 Main St., LLC, 937 N.E.2d 977 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 2010); Pellegrini, 876 N.E.2d 498; HS Land Trust, 2012 WL 5362885. 
226. Pellegrini, 876 N.E.2d. 
227. Bennett, 64 Mass. at 167. 
228. The court seems to use the terms “tenant at will” and “tenant at sufferance” 
interchangeably in referring to the mortgagor who remains in possession of the foreclosed real 
estate.  See e.g., Bennett, 64 Mass. 163 (characterizing the mortgagor as a tenant at will of the 
mortgagee); Ayres v. Waite, 64 Mass. 72, 74 (1852) (referring to the mortgagor as a tenant at 
will or at sufferance of the mortgagee); Fay, 22 Mass. at 425 (denoting the mortgagor as a 
tenant at will of the mortgagee). 
229. Bennett, 64 Mass. at 167. 
230. Id. at 167. 
231. Ayres, 64 Mass. at 74. 
232. Cunningham v. Davis, 56 N.E. 2, 5 (1900). 
233. Id. at 5.  
234. Swift v. Mendell, 62 Mass. 357, 358 (1851). 
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the occupation and possession of an estate.235  It is clear that the line of 
authority on this issue stands for the proposition that the mortgagor’s 
continued possession is considered to be for the possession of the 
mortgagee.236  However, the cases conflict with regards to whether the 
mortgagor has the ability to oppose the mortgagee’s possession by an act 
adverse to the mortgagee.237  Furthermore, there is no well-defined 
standard for establishing when an act rises to the level of being adverse 
to the mortgagee.238  All of these problems present with the 
Massachusetts foreclosure by entry statute call for legislative or judicial 
clarification. 
IV. PRACTICAL ISSUES STEMMING FROM THE FORECLOSURE BY 
ENTRY PROVISION 
A. Foreclosure By Entry as a Fallback—Advantages of the Mortgagee 
It is common practice for mortgagees to use foreclosure by entry 
and foreclosure by power of sale concurrently.239  Oftentimes, a 
mortgagee employs both foreclosure methods concurrently by making a 
peaceable entry on the premises and recording a certificate thereof so as 
to initiate the foreclosure by entry process, while at the same time 
beginning the process of exercising a power of sale in the mortgage.240  
In doing so, the mortgagee is able to ensure that in the case of some 
defect arising in one of the methods used, the mortgagor’s equity of 
redemption will be foreclosed by the proper employment of the other 
 
235. “[W]e consider that the mortgagor continued as before, occupying the premises; 
but the difference is, that after the entry to foreclose, he held as tenant to the mortgagee and in 
subordination to his right of possession.”  Id. at 358. 
236. Ayres v. Waite, 64 Mass. at 74-75. 
237. See e.g., Holmes v. Turner’s Falls Lumber Co., 23 N.E. 305 (Mass. 1890) (stating 
that in order for the mortgagor to disseize the mortgagee it must be made known to the 
mortgagee that the mortgagor made some claim adverse to the mortgagee); Lennon v. Porter, 
71 Mass. 318 (1855) (stating that the mortgagor cannot disseize its mortgagee, or defeat its 
right of possession because all acts are considered to be done in subordination to the title of 
the mortgagee); Ayres, 64 Mass. at 72 (stating that the mortgagor cannot disseize the 
mortgagee because the mortgagor’s possession is not his own).  
238. The statute provides no clear direction to what would constitute an act adverse to 
the mortgagee.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 1 (2012). None of the relevant cases provide a 
standard either.  See e.g., Holmes, 23 N.E. 305; Lennon, 71 Mass. 318; Ayres, 64 Mass. 72. 
239. Harlow Realty Co. v. Cotter, 187 N.E. 118, 119 (1933).  “Although either 
[foreclosure by power of sale or foreclosure by entry] can be used individually, the ‘belt and 
suspenders’ combination of both methods [of foreclosure] serves best to provide a title that is 
insulated from collateral attack in both the short and the long term.”  Nolan, supra note 107, § 
17.4. 
240. 14C MASS. PRAC., supra note 24, § 15.127; Harlow Realty Co. v. Cotter, 187 N.E. 
at 119 (stating “[i]t is common practice for mortgagees to use both these methods of 
foreclosure concurrently.”). 
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method.241  This stems from the notion that foreclosure by entry allows a 
ground for a claim of clear title separate from the foreclosure by power 
of sale.242  Massachusetts’s system allows foreclosing parties to correct 
defects in their authority to foreclose on property after the completion of 
a sale by utilizing the foreclosure by entry procedure.243  It seems as 
though allowing the mortgagee to employ two distinct methods of 
foreclosure at the same time does nothing more than to ensure that the 
mortgagee is able to foreclose.244 
B. Available Remedies to Homeowners for Redeeming the Premises 
and Defending Against Foreclosures By Entry 
The most obvious defense against a foreclosure is that the 
mortgagor did not in fact default on any of the conditions of the 
mortgage.245  Another defense is that the party foreclosing lacked 
“jurisdiction and authority” to effect such foreclosure.246  This notion 
was recently affirmed in the landmark case of U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n v. 
Ibanez, in which the SJC of Massachusetts held foreclosure sales to be 
invalid because the purchasers failed to show they were the mortgage 
holders at the time of foreclosure.247 
Another possible defense against a foreclosure by entry is waiver.248  
A waiver may either be express or implied by conduct inconsistent with 
an intention to retain the benefit of the entry and complete the 
foreclosure in that fashion.249  The mortgagor’s continued possession 
 
241. 14C MASS. PRAC., supra note 24, § 15.127; see Grabiel v. Michelson, 8 N.E.2d 
764, 765 (Mass. 1937) (foreclosure by entry and possession was valid even though there may 
have been irregularities in the exercise of the power of sale in the mortgage). 
242. U.S. Bank Nat’l. Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 49 n.15 (Mass. 2011). 
243. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, §§ 1, 2 (2012); see Renuart, supra note 67, at 149. 
244. The notion that the only purpose the provision serves is a safety net for mortgagees 
is further demonstrated by an excerpt from a practice guide stating that, “[s]ince the Land 
Court requirements for notice tend to be more strict than those of the Superior Court, it may be 
faster and more economical to bring the proceeding in the appropriate Superior Court.”  15A 
MASS. PRAC., supra note 172, § 28:82.  Furthermore, there are normal methods to remedy a 
defective foreclosure, which raises the issue of why such remedies exist if it can be done by 
utilizing the foreclosure by entry as an alternative foreclosure.  Rather, it follows logically that 
because those other methods of remedying are available, foreclosure by entry should not be 
used in place of them. 
245. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 1 (2012). 
246. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Wain, No. 12 MISC 459002(AHS), 2012 WL 
5475849, 6 (Mass. Land Ct. Nov. 9, 2012) (quoting U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 941 N.E.2d at 50). 
247. U.S. Bank Nat’l. Ass’n, 941 N.E.2d at 44. 
248. “Entry under foreclosure is subject to waiver, and a foreclosure by entry may be 
opened by agreement.”  59 C.J.S. MORTGAGES § 729 (2009).  See Botham v. McIntier, 36 
Mass. 346, 346 (1837). 
249. 59 C.J.S. MORTGAGES § 729 (2009); see Joyner v. Lenox Sav. Bank, 76 N.E.2d 
169, 174 (Mass. 1947). 
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after formal entry of the mortgagee for foreclosure “under circumstances 
strongly indicating that the real relation between the parties is that 
merely of debtor and creditor,” may suffice to show a waiver.250  If, after 
an entry for foreclosure, the mortgagee accepts a new security for the 
same debt, it constitutes a waiver of the entry.251  Conversely, the mere 
receipt of rents and their subsequent application to payment of amounts 
due on the mortgage debt does not establish a waiver of the entry to 
foreclose if the total currently outstanding on the debt is not paid off 
completely.252 
In Fay v Valentine, the trial court held that a mortgagee’s entry for 
the purpose of effectuating a foreclosure by entry, while she had an 
action pending for recovery of possession, could not be considered as 
intended for the purpose of foreclosure.253  The court noted that had the 
mortgagee discontinued the suit for possession of the premises, the result 
might have been otherwise.254  However, the court reasoned that for the 
mortgagee to pursue the action at the cost of the mortgagor, it should be 
construed to be a waiver of her right to foreclose under that entry.255 
C. The Provision’s Relevancy in Light of the Recent Foreclosure Crisis 
From the perspective of the mortgagor, the foreclosure by entry 
provision seems as though its only purpose is to ensure that mortgagees 
can foreclose on real estate.256  However, the perspective of the 
mortgagee is that there should be a way for mortgage lenders to 
foreclose after a period of time if the homeowner is found to be absent.  
In this case, the mortgagee is able to utilize the foreclosure by entry 
provision as a way of maintaining a type of administrative ease in 
foreclosing on a mortgaged property when the mortgagor is nowhere to 
be found.257  In such a situation where the mortgagor is absent for a long 
period of time, logic indicates it is significantly more cost-effective to 
foreclose by entry and continued possession rather than by power of sale 
 
250. 59 C.J.S. MORTGAGES § 729 (2009); see Trow v. Berry, 113 Mass. 139, 147 
(1873). 
251. 59 C.J.S. MORTGAGES § 729 (2009); see Trow, 113 Mass. at 147. 
252. Joyner, 76 N.E.2d at 174; 59 C.J.S. MORTGAGES § 729 (2009). 
253. Fay v. Valentine, 22 Mass. 418, 425 (1827). 
254. Id. at 425. 
255. Id. at 425. 
256. 14C MASS. PRAC., supra note 24, § 15.127  (“A mortgagee may, and often does, 
employ both of the commonly used foreclosure methods concurrently . . . [T]he mortgagee 
can ensure that if there is some defect in one of the methods used, the mortgagor’s right of 
redemption will be foreclosed by the . . . other method.”). There is no other reason for 
instituting a foreclosure by entry in addition to a sale other than a backup to ensure the 
foreclosure is effectuated. 
257. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 1 (2012). 
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or by any other available method. 
However, an obvious counterargument to the position that 
foreclosure by entry is necessary in order for administrative ease in 
foreclosing on properties with absent mortgagors is that sanitary codes 
and public policy concerns regarding abandoned property now serve that 
purpose.258  Essentially, the modern day enactments have replaced the 
need for such a method of foreclosure.259  Therefore, it seems as though 
the foreclosure by entry provision should be revised to incorporate a 
requirement that it need only be utilized when the mortgagor is absent 
for a specified period of time, in order to better accomplish the intended 
purpose of the statute while eliminating the burden from existing 
homeowners. 
CONCLUSION 
The Massachusetts foreclosure by entry statutory provision is vague 
and overbroad.  Not only does the statute lack clarity in definition and 
application, but the cases that apply it are inconsistent and simply 
emphasize the ambiguity present within the statute.  The statute’s lack of 
an actual notice requirement places an undue burden on mortgagors to 
consult the registry of deeds periodically to check whether a certificate 
of entry has been recorded against their property in order to determine 
whether they are subject to a foreclosure.  Moreover, the fact that there is 
no time limit on the recording of the certificate of entry gives the 
mortgagee an unfair advantage in regards to deciding when the 
redemption period during which the mortgagor is able to redeem the 
premises begins to run.   
In addition to burdening the mortgagor, allowing for “constructive” 
notice to constitute ample notice to the mortgagor is simply an 
unrealistic expectation.  Furthermore, the statute’s usage of an “open and 
peaceable entry” and “continued possession” accomplishes nothing in 
the way of clarification.260  The cases interpreting the statute fail in a 
similar fashion because the line of authority seems to be inconsistent and 
outdated in modern society.261  Additionally, the foreclosure by entry 
 
258. 14B MASS. PRAC., SUMMARY OF BASIC LAW § 12.82 (4th ed. 2007); see MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 127A-I (2012). 
259. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 1 (2012). 
260. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 1 (2012). 
261. See e.g., Holmes v. Turner’s Falls Lumber Co., 23 N.E. 305 (Mass. 1890); Fletcher 
v. Cary, 103 Mass. 475 (1870); Ellis v. Drake, 90 Mass. 161, 163 (1864); Lennon v. Porter, 71 
Mass. 318 (1855); Ayres v. Waite, 64 Mass. 72 (1852); Swift v. Mendell, 62 Mass. 357 
(1851); Bennett v. Conant, 64 Mass. 163 (1852); Fay v. Valentine, 22 Mass. 418 (1827); 
Skinner v. Brewer, 21 Mass. 468 (1827); Thayer v. Smith, 17 Mass. 429 (1821); discussion of 
Walker v. Thayer supra Introduction, note 13. 
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provision does not accomplish anything that sanitation codes and current 
public policy concerns would not.262 
The burdens that the Massachusetts foreclosure by entry provision 
places on mortgagors are best understood when they are viewed 
practically as illustrated by the above-mentioned example.  Applying the 
law as it now stands to the hypothetical first posed, Mary, the young 
mother, would be without any legal remedy against the foreclosure and 
would have no choice but to be subjected to an eviction proceeding, 
subsequently compelling her to vacate the land.  However, if 
Massachusetts had an actual notice requirement, Mary would have been 
informed that the foreclosure by entry had been initiated, and she would 
have realized that she lacked insurance on the mortgaged property. 
Thus, the presence of an actual notice requirement would have 
alerted Mary to the problem, and she would have been able to obtain the 
requisite insurance and ultimately could have avoided a devastating 
situation three years later.263  Furthermore, if foreclosure could only be 
instituted when the mortgagor is absent for a long period of time, it 
would not be allowed in Mary’s case, and therefore, a foreclosure by 
power of sale which requires actual notice would have been instituted 
and led to the same result as above. 
Therefore, the statute should be legislatively revised and judicially 
clarified in order to allow for a purer understanding of the statutory 
requirements and to permit a more unified application of the doctrine.  
Requiring actual notice to be given to the mortgagor would ensure 
fairness to all of the parties involved in the foreclosure by entry process.  
Re-implementing the thirty-day recording limitation would also be a 
beneficial modification.  Doing so would prevent the mortgagee from 
making the entry and waiting to record the certificate for a long period of 
time, which effectively conceals when the redemption period begins to 
run. 
Brittani K. Morgan* 
 
262. 105 MASS. CODE REGS. 410.001-410.990. 
263. That is assuming that the mortgagee did not accelerate the mortgage, or even if the 
mortgage was accelerated, that the mortgagee consented to the mortgagor’s request that the 
mortgage be reinstated. 
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